November, 1913

“A sacrilegious and sinister fellow,” was how the established elites of Mencken’s time saw the just passed figure of Nietzsche, and Mencken seemed determined to pluck that same establishment beard. Nevertheless Mencken mentions that the least appalling of the Polish-German philosopher’s ideas had slipped into the established consciousness where they “stood in somewhat violent opposition to the common platitudes.”

As a writer it is difficult to read Mencken without wonder and envy. He has the best non-fiction style I have encountered in over 2,000 books. Rather than summarize his thoughts I would rather present some of his words, from the apex paragraph of this four paragraph encapsulation of the mental framework of a dark genius’ regard for the human world:

“Not, of course, that Nietzsche threatens, today or in the near future, to make a grand conquest of Christendom, as Paul conquered, or the unknown Father of Republics. Far from it, indeed. Filtered through the comic sieve of Shaw or sentimentalized by a Roosevelt, some of his ideas show a considerable popularity, but in their original state they are not likely to inflame millions. Broadly viewed, they stand in direct opposition to every dream that soothes the slumber of mankind in the mass, and therefore mankind in the mass must needs be suspicious of them, at least for years to come. They are pre-eminently for the man who is not of the mass, for the man whose head is lifted, however little, above the common level. They justify the success of that man, as Christianity justifies the failure of the man below. And so they give no promise of winning the race in general from its old idols, despite the fact that the pull of natural laws and of elemental appetites is on their side. But insomuch as an idea, to make itself felt in the world, need not convert the many who serve and wait but only the few who rule, it must be manifest that the Nietzschean creed, in the long run, gives promise of exercising a very real influence upon human thought. Reduced to a single phrase, it may be called a counterblast to sentimentality—and it is precisely by breaking down sentimentality, with its fondness for moribund gods, that human progress is made. If Nietzsche had left no other vital message to his time, he would have at least forced and deserved a hearing for his warning that Christianity is a theory for those who distrust and despair of their strength, and not for those who hope and fight on.”

I very much like that Mencken saw religion and philosophy as contesting on the same plane, competing in the same vein for sway over the human mind. This naturally leads to the conclusion that any secular creed may rise as a default religion, a faith with adherents as orthodox in their intolerance of opposing views as any ancient faith. Mencken, himself, I suspect would be fascinated that he has been condemned by such very atheist adherents to a secular creed so anti-Nietzschean as to have gone Christianity one better, not content with accepting human failure, but sanctifying and even glorifying it, while at the same time denying the transcendent and redemptive aspects of traditional sacrificial theologies.